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UNU-MERIT, Maastricht 
 
Version, June 2013 
 
 
Abstract 
 
On 1 January 2005, the international trade in textile and clothing was freed from the quota 
restrictions that had persisted for more than four decades. This study tests one of the predictions 
that countries effectively constrained by quotas in the major world markets will increase their 
exports at the expense of non-quota-constrained suppliers. The focus is on clothing imports of 
the two major markets, the US and EU-15. These markets are separately analysed as they 
constitute different lists of quota-constrained countries, QCCs. Unlike others, this study uses a 
relatively longer data set of post-quota years, which allows us to understand the medium-term 
adjustment process of exporters following quota removal. We find a large amount of 
heterogeneity among the QCCs in their post-quota export performance. Only a few QCCs have 
benefited at the expense of not only the non-quota countries but also fellow QCCs. The estimates 
show that almost half of the QCCs were better off under the quota regime at least in terms of 
exports. The factors most likely to have influenced their heterogeneous performance are also 
examined. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Despite the significant liberalization progress of global trade through the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Textiles and Clothing (hereafter T&C) was among the few categories 
that until recently had been under quota restriction in developed countries’ markets. Quotas were 
institutionalized into the international trading system in the 1960s, when the Short-Term 
Arrangement (STA) and the Long-Term Arrangement (LTA) were agreed for a unilateral quota 
to be imposed on countries where there were ‘market disruptions’ on the basis of providing 
temporary protection for the T&C industry in the developed countries.1 These arrangements were 
replaced by the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) in 1974, which extends the coverage of products 
under quota (from merely cotton to synthetic fibres, wool, silk and ramie) and the number of 
countries. The MFA established a quota system that limits the amount of imports of T&C 
products from developing countries to developed countries. The developed countries, particularly 
the European Union (EU), the United States of America (USA), Canada, Norway, Finland and 
Austria, had actively applied the quota system (WTO, 2012). 
In 1994, after various rounds of negotiations, an Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) 
was reached to eliminate the quota restrictions in four steps over a 10-year period starting in 
1995. Following this agreement, T&C was gradually integrated into the GATT and the quota 
restrictions totally phased out on 1 January 2005. Parallel to the implementation of the ATC, the 
developed countries, particularly the US and the EU, offered preferential treatment to many 
developing countries under different agreements.2 Both the US and the EU also entered into 
reciprocal free trade agreements (FTA) with their neighbours.3 The former aims to help the 
developing countries diversify their exports, while the latter aims to prevent loss of competition 
of domestic industry by creating regional markets. 
                                                            
1 The quota restriction has, in fact, a far longer history. In the 1930s and 1950s the developed countries imposed 
Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs) to restrict import competition of T&C from developing countries. 
2 The US non-reciprocal preferential treatment includes the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), the Andean Trade 
Preferences Act (ATPA) and the Africa Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA). The EU preferential access includes 
schemes such as African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) and Everything But Arms (EBA). 
3 One of the notable regional FTAs is the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a trilateral trade 
agreement among the US, Canada and Mexico. The EU has a reciprocal FTA agreement with six Mediterranean 
countries (EU-MED) and several Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), most of which later joined the 
EU. 
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The trade policies of the major clothing importer countries, on the one hand the imposition of 
quotas on exports from certain countries and, on the other hand, the provision of preferential 
treatment to other selected countries, led to a shift of production from quota-constrained to less 
constrained (or favoured) nations, thus increasing fragmentation of export sourcing (UNCTAD, 
2005). Another notable trend in the two decades prior to the removal of quotas was the 
increasing regionalization of trade, which stemmed from regional accords such as CBI and 
NAFTA in the Americas and from association agreements between the EU and neighbouring 
regions, the Mediterranean and CEEC countries (Avisse and Fouquin, 2001; Elbehri, 2004; 
UNCTAD, 2005). 
The abolition of the quota system was, therefore, expected to reverse these trends. A number 
of simulation studies forecasted ex ante the likely effect of the removal of the quota system on 
world T&C trade patterns.4 First, the liberalization of quotas will increase substantially global 
trade in T&C.5 Second, the impact is expected to differ among countries depending on their 
initial conditions and capabilities to respond to the liberalization. Countries effectively 
constrained by quota will increase their exports at the expense of countries that developed their 
export under preferential treatment in the major markets.6 Third, the removal will most likely 
reverse the international fragmentation of the supply chain and lead to a high concentration of 
production in countries with large producing capacity, such as China and India.7 The implication 
is that the QCCs will not benefit equally from quota removal. Different factors, including 
restrictiveness of the quota limit, economies of scale, local textile base and other sources of 
competitiveness, might influence the relative post-quota-period performance of the QCCs 
(Adhikari and Yamamoto, 2007; Brenton and Hoppe, 2007).  
                                                            
4 OECD (2003) and USITC (2004) have excellent review on the quantitative predictions of the impact of quota 
removal. 
5 Diao and Somwaru (2001) estimated that over the 25 years following the elimination of quotas, global T&C trade 
levels will increase by 5 per cent and 16 per cent respectively. Avisse and Fouquin (2001) also predicted a rise of 10 
per cent and 14 per cent in T&C global trade respectively. 
6 Terra (2001) predicts that apparel production of the quota-constrained exporters will, as a whole, increase by 
almost 20 per cent, while the market shares of non-quota-constrained suppliers (e.g. Mexico as well as African and 
CBI countries) will shrink. Similarly, Diao and Somwaru (2001) estimate shows that the non-quota-holding 
developing countries will lose about 20 per cent of their markets. 
7 For example, Spinanger (2003) shows that China will double its T&C exports and account for close to 50 per cent 
of world exports. MacDonald et al.’s (2004) estimates show an increase of Chinese clothing exports in 2005 by 7 per 
cent and in 2014 by 16 per cent. Similarly, India was also expected to increase its exports by 5 per cent and 14 per 
cent in 2005 and 2014 respectively. Nordås (2004), on the other hand, predicted that both India and China would 
almost double their market shares in clothing imports to the EU (to 9 per cent and 29 per cent respectively) and 
would increase by three- to four-fold in their market shares in clothing imports to the US (to 15 per cent and 50 per 
cent, respectively). 
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Although several years have elapsed since the long-awaited removal of the quotas on T&C, 
there is scarcity of ex post analysis of the actual impact on the patterns of trade flows. The few 
existing studies rely on data covering only the first 1–2 post-quota years. Adhikari and 
Yamamoto (2007) and Curran (2008) provide some descriptive evidence on the impact of quota 
removal on T&C exports to the major world markets based only on the first post-quota-year data. 
Harrigan and Barrows (2009) examine the impact of quota removal on price and quality 
upgrading, focusing on the US market. Based on comparison of the last year of the quota period 
(2004) and the first year of the post-quota period (2005), they observed a sharp decline in the 
price and quality of T&C imports from QCCs (particularly China) following quota removal.8 
Brambilla et al. (2007) examine the relative performance of China in the US market by each 
phase of the quota relaxation. They found a surge of Chinese exports to the US market, with a 
negative impact on most of the other exporter countries. They also reported a large decline in 
export unit values across all US trading partners. Their analysis of the last phase of quota 
relaxation is, however, based only on one post-quota year (that is, 2005). Thus far we know little 
about the medium- to long-term adjustment process of the T&C exporting countries following 
quota removal. 
The aim of this study is to address this gap in the literature. It specifically tests one of the 
predictions that countries effectively constrained by quota in the major world markets will 
increase their exports at the expense of non-quota-constrained suppliers. Unlike previous studies, 
it uses relatively longer panel data covering five pre- and five post-quota years (2000–09) of 
imports to the two largest world markets, the US and the EU. The focus in this study is the 
clothing trade, although quota removal also affects the textile trade.9 The US and EU markets are 
examined separately as they constitute different lists of quota-constrained nations to their 
respective markets. The number of EU member countries has been growing through time and 
reached 27 by 2007, but in this study we focus on the 15 member countries (hereafter EU-15) 
that were in the union throughout our sample period (2000–09).10 In 2009, the US and EU-15 
                                                            
8 They also examined the impact of quota removal on welfare of US consumers and found positive gains due to 
increasing quantity and reduction in price. 
9 Curran (2008) argues that the two sectors are different in terms of structure and character. The textile industry is 
relatively capital intensive and developed countries still have comparative advantage, whereas the clothing industry 
is labor intensive, providing comparative advantage to the low-wage countries. The impact of liberalization is, 
therefore, likely to be different between these industries. 
10 The EU-15 members are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, 
Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.  
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markets respectively accounted for about 22 per cent and 43.2 per cent of world clothing 
imports.11 Over 200 countries have been identified with positive exports to each of these markets 
in the sample period. 
The focus of the empirical analysis is the last phase of quota removal. This is because 
although the signatory countries agreed to integrate with GATT rules for a specified minimum 
share of their T&C imports at the start of each phase, little liberalization took place in the first 
three stages. The US and EU eliminated no more than 7 per cent of the quotas carried over from 
the MFA during the first three stages. Most products integrated with GATT rules in the first 
three stages were either not subject to quotas or were subject to non-binding quotas with low 
utilization rates (Mayer, 2005). In effect the US and EU were left with hundreds of quantitative 
restrictions covering 44 and 15 exporter countries respectively until the end of December 2004 
(see Table A1 in the Appendix). The major impact of quota removal was, therefore, felt in the 
last stage of liberalization (Harrigan and Barrows, 2009). The collective and country-specific 
export performance of the QCCs in these markets is evaluated using the difference-in-difference 
(DD) estimation method. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section develops the model 
and section 3 sets the empirical strategy. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 provides the 
main results. Section 6 discusses the extent and likely source of heterogeneity among the QCCs. 
The last section concludes. 
 
2. The model 
 
The gravity model is the workhorse for empirical studies in international trade. The simplest 
gravity model states that the volume of trade between two countries is an increasing function of 
their income and a decreasing function of the distance between them. Although the model is 
often criticized for lacking theoretical underpinning, several studies have shown that the gravity 
equation is consistent with varieties of Ricardian and Heckscher–Ohlin models. Anderson (1979) 
presented a theoretical foundation for the gravity model based on constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) preferences and goods that are differentiated by region of origin. Deardorff 
                                                            
11 When considering the larger EU block (EU-27), its world share of clothing imports in 2009 was 50 per cent.  
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(1998) derived a gravity equation in the Heckscher–Ohlin model with complete specialization. 
Eaton and Kortum (2002) developed a gravity equation based on aggregate homogeneous goods.  
Here we follow recent studies (among others, Redding and Venables, 2002; Anderson and 
Wincoop, 2003; 2004; Helpman et al., 2007) to develop one of the trade models based on 
product differentiation with a CES preference in which the elasticity of substitution between any 
pairs of products is the same. Consider a number of countries i = 1, …, M, producing a range of 
products. The representative utility function of country j is given by  
 
࣯୨ ൌ ቂ∑ α୧ݔ୧୨ሺ஢ିଵሻ ஢⁄M୧ୀଵ ቃ
஢ ሺ஢ିଵሻ⁄
        (1) 
 
where ݔij consumption of country j consumers of goods imported from country i and αi 
is country-of-origin weight applied when aggregating. The parameter σ is the elasticity of 
substitution between products. 
The optimal import demand of country j can be obtained by maximizing the CES component 
of utility function subject to the budget constraint, ∑݌௜௝ݔ௜௝ ൌ ݕ௝, where ݕ௝ is country j’s total 
expenditure on the imported product ݔ, and ݌ij is the price charged by exporter from country i for 
exports to j. 
 
ݔ୧୨ ൌ p୧୨ି஢y୨P୨஢ିଵ      (2) 
 
Pj is the composite price index for importer j defined over the prices of individual varieties 
produced in i, sold in j and given by 
 
P୨ ൌ ൣ∑ α୧p୧୨ଵି஢M୧ୀଵ ൧
ଵ ଵି஢ൗ       (3) 
 
Now we return to the producer characteristics. Let us assume perfect competition and 
constant returns to scale; thus the producer price will be equal to marginal cost in equilibrium.12 
The price charged by producer of country i for the domestic market is ݌i  ൌ  ciα, where ci is 
                                                            
12 These results hold even if we assume monopolistic competition whereby the price equation is given as ݌௜ ൌሺܿ௜αሻ/ߤ; where ߤ reflects the standard markup parameter (see Helpman et al., 2008). 
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country-specific production costs and α is the index of the inverse of labour productivity 
capturing the realization of technology in good ݔ.13 But when selling abroad the exporters from 
country i incur additional trade costs. Thus the landed (c.i.f) price of the export product from 
exporter i in country j becomes ݌ij ൌ pitij, where tij is equal to one plus the tax equivalent of trade 
barriers.14  
If we assume that consumers in the importing country j have similar preferences for a 
particular good irrespective of their country of origin and always buy from the cheapest source, 
then the probability of shipment from country i is lowered by the production cost (ciα) and trade 
cost (tij) of getting the good to country j, relative to the average production cost and trade cost of 
shipping from all other destinations (Anderson and Wincoop, 2004). We assume multiplicative 
form and decompose the trade costs into three major components: tariff, transport costs and 
quotas, and redefine the c.i.f price as follows: 
 
p୧୨ ൌ p୧൫1 ൅ τ୧୨൯൫1 ൅ ω୧୨൯ሺ1 ൅ η୧୨ሻ   (4) 
 
where τij is the tariff rate, ωij is the tariff-equivalent freight cost, and ߟij is tariff-equivalent 
quantitative restraints, all referring to imports from country i to country j. 
The tariffs and transport costs are obviously added to the import price and reduce demand, 
thus reducing imports. Under competitive condition the quota is equivalent to a specific tariff 
(Falvey, 1979); thus it can have the same impact. If country j imposes binding quotas on the 
quantity of specific product imported from country i, then a smaller quantity of that product is 
imported. The excess demand pushes up the domestic price in the importing country, and thus 
creates a wedge between average price and quota-driven price. 
Substituting equation (4) into (2) and taking logs gives the following county j’s import 
demand of product ݔ from country i. 
 
lnݔ୧୨ ൌ logy୨ ൅ ሺσ െ 1ሻlnP୨ െ σlogp୧ െ σlnሺ1 ൅ τ୧୨ሻ െ σ lnሺ1 ൅ ߱୧୨ሻ െ σlnሺ1 ൅ η୧୨ሻ  (5) 
                                                            
13 One interpretation of ci is the prevailing average wage in the country i exogenous to each firm but endogenous to 
the country.  
14 It is quite common in the literature to use the iceberg assumption to represent the variable trade barriers such as 
tariffs and transport costs that shipping more than one unit of output is required for one unit to arrive at its 
destination. Normalizing tij to one measures zero trade barriers. 
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This is equivalent to what is often derived from the gravity equations of bilateral trade 
except for the two prices: the importer price index Pj and the exporter fob price pi (Anderson and 
Wincoop, 2003). The standard practice in the empirical literature is to handle these two prices 
respectively as importing and exporting country fixed effects (e.g. Francois and Manchin, 2007; 
Helpman et al., 2008). A further reduced form is obtained when the income of the importing 
country, yj, is similarly included in the country fixed effect. 
 
lnݔ୧୨ ൌ D୨ ൅ D୧ െ σlnሺ1 ൅ τ୧୨ሻ െ σ lnሺ1 ൅ ߱୧୨ሻ െ σlnሺ1 ൅ η୧୨ሻ   (6) 
 
where D୨ ൌ lny୨ ൅ ሺσ െ 1ሻlnP୨ is the importer fixed effect and D୧ ൌ െσlnp୧ is the exporter 
country fixed effect. 
This equation enables us to focus on the trade barriers as the country dummy variables 
subsume a range of country-specific effects such as income level, fob price, country size and 
distance.  
The above equation also has intuitive implications for the impact of quota imposition or 
elimination on the import sourcing of the quota-imposing country, which is our main interest in 
this study. The imposition of quota has at least two impacts on the sourcing of imports.15 First, 
the quantities imported from exporters subject to a binding quota will be strictly lower. Second, 
there will be at least as many, and possibly more, countries exporting to the quota-imposing 
importer, and thus fragmentation of suppliers. Removing quotas should then reverse the 
fragmentation process and lead to concentration of import sourcing. Hence, countries effectively 
constrained by quotas should increase their exports at the expense of quota-free supplier 
countries. 
 
3. Identification strategy 
 
Equation (6) defines import demand as a function of trade costs plus country fixed effects. The 
tariff variable is observable and we use applied tariff rate τit by the importer on products 
                                                            
15 Quotas could also lead to quality upgrading, which refers to either a shift in demand towards higher-priced import 
varieties (i.e. change in product mix), or to the addition of improved characteristics to each variety (Feenstra, 1995). 
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imported from country i at time t. International transport cost is also observable and we use the 
share of freight cost in total import value, ωit, which is equivalent to the ad valorem tariff rate. 
The price wedge due to quota (ߟit) is not observed but proxied here by a dummy, QCCi, 
indicating if country exporter i was subject to quotas in the importing country in the given 
period. As the import equation is separately estimated for each of the two major world clothing 
markets, the US and EU, there is no need to include importer country fixed effects. On the other 
hand, since we are using panel data of apparel imports from over 200 countries for the period 
2000–09, which are disaggregated at the 4-digit level, we introduce time and product fixed 
effects in addition to exporter fixed effects. The time effect enables us to control for other macro 
movements on either side. To reflect these we reformulate equation (6) as follows:  
 
݈݊ݔ௜௖௧௝ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ܦ௜ ൅ ܿ௜ ൅ ߣ௧ ൅ ߚଵ݈݊ ௜ܶ௧ ൅ ߚଶ݈݊ ௜݂௧ ൅ ߚଷܳܥܥ௜ ൅ ߳௜௖௧   (7) 
 
where ݈݊ݔ௜௖௧௝  denotes the log of volume of clothing imports of product type c into market j from 
exporter country i in period t; Tit is one plus ad valorem tariff rate (1 + τit); ݂it is one plus tariff-
equivalent transport cost (1 + ωit); QCC a dummy for quota-constrained country, Di, ci and λt are 
respectively country (exporter), product, and year fixed effects; and єict is an idiosyncratic error 
term. 
The coefficients β1 and β2 measure the elasticity of imports respectively with regard to tariff 
and transport cost barriers. The main focus of this study is to examine the response of the QCCs 
to the total phasing out of quotas by the end of 2004. To capture this we replace the QCC dummy 
with an interactive term of QCC and a post-quota-period dummy (PQP).16 This interactive term, 
here denoted as QCC × PQP, switches from zero to one for all QCCs starting from 2005. 
 
݈݊ݔ௜௖௧௝ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ܦ௜ ൅ ܿ௜ ൅ ߣ௧ ൅ ߚଵ݈݊ ௜ܶ௖௧ ൅ ߚଶ݈݊ ௜݂௧ ൅ ߚଷሺܳܥܥ ൈ ܲܳܲሻ௜ ൅ ߳௜௣௧  (8) 
 
                                                            
16 One may keep both the uninteracted terms (PQP and QCC) in the equation along with the interaction term (QCC 
× PQP). But in the presence of the interaction term the main effect of primary factors, while it may sometimes 
provide a useful qualitative synthesis, is not relevant for detailed interpretation (González and Cox, 2007). In the 
present context PQP could be interpreted as the possible aggregate factor that would cause changes in exports in the 
absence of policy change, with QCC as the difference between treatment and control group prior to policy change. 
Moreover, the inclusion of these uninteracted terms does not make any difference to the coefficients of the other 
variables. 
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The coefficient of the interaction term (β3) now measures the size of the impact of quota 
removal on the QCCs. This coefficient is identified by difference-in-difference (DD) variation, 
i.e. how exports from the QCCs (the treatment group) changed after 2005 in contrast to exports 
from quota-free and/or preferred countries (the control group).  
 
DD ൌ ሺݔ୧ୡ୲வଶ଴଴ସQCC െ ݔ୧ୡ୲ஸଶ଴଴ସQCC ሻെ ሺݔ୧ୡ୲வଶ଴଴ସNQCC െ ݔ୧ୡ୲ஸଶ଴଴ସNQCC ሻ            (9) 
 
The quota-constraint dummy, QCC, may not indicate restrictiveness of the quota as the 
quota limits were not uniform across the QCCs and did not bind all of them equally. Fill rate 
provides a useful indication of quota restrictiveness. We thus differentiate QCCs under binding 
quotas from those less restricted QCCs based on fill rate of the quota limit applied for each MFA 
category. The relative performance of the effectively constrained countries by the quota limit 
(high fill rate) could similarly be identified using the DD method.  
 
DD ൌ ሺݔ୧ୡ୲வଶ଴଴ସH୧୥୦f୧୪୪ െ ݔ୧ୡ୲ஸଶ଴଴ସH୧୥୦f୧୪୪ ሻെ ሺݔ୧ୡ୲வଶ଴଴ସROW െ ݔ୧ୡ୲ஸଶ଴଴ସROW ሻ            (9′) 
 
where Highfill denotes QCCs with high fill rate and ROW represents the rest of the world 
including those QCCs with lower fill rate in 2004.  
The DD method has become increasingly popular in estimating the effect of policy 
intervention (e.g. Friedberg, 1998; Wolfers, 2006; Bertrand et al., 2004; Wooldridge, 2002; 
Athey and Imbens, 2006). A number of studies focusing on trade policy impact have also applied 
the DD estimation (e.g. Collier and Venables, 2007; Harrigan and Barrows, 2009; Frazer and 
Biesebroeck, 2010). There are, however, statistical and estimation issues in applying it, some of 
which are discussed below. 
First, Wolfers (2006) argues that a specification of treatment with only a single unilateral 
dummy (identifying before and after) cannot fully capture the dynamics, i.e. the adjustment 
process following the intervention, and suggests the use of full post-intervention group of year 
dummies. Introducing the full post-treatment interaction term might be more informative about 
the dynamics of response. Moreover, it is also possible that the gains from treatment depend not 
only on observed and unobserved heterogeneity but also on time (Wooldridge, 2005). In light of 
11 
 
this we also examine the year-by-year difference in response in the post-quota period for the 
QCCs using the following specification: 
 
lnݔ୧ୡ୲୨ ൌ β଴ ൅ D୧ ൅ c୧ ൅ λ୲ ൅ βଵlnT୧ୡ୲ ൅ βଶ݈݊ ୧݂୲ ൅ ∑ β୩ஹଶ଴଴ହ ୩ ሺQCC ൈ PQPሻ୧୲ ൅ Ԗ୧୮୲  (10) 
 
Second, unbiasedness of the DD estimator requires that the policy change not be 
systematically related to other unobserved factors that affect the outcome. The pooled ordinary 
least square (OLS) is biased and inconsistent if the unobserved effect is correlated with the 
explanatory variable including the intervention variable. The fixed effect (FE) estimator allows 
unobserved heterogeneity to be correlated with other explanatory variables in the model. One 
criticism of the FE estimator is that if policy changes as a reaction to past outcome, then the 
critical assumption in the FE estimator that the idiosyncratic error term is uncorrelated with the 
unobserved effect might be violated. In our case, however, the exogeneity assumption between 
unobserved effect and idiosyncratic errors is not unreasonable. This is because the policy 
intervention (elimination of quota) was fully anticipated and statistically exogenous, and 
continues to be effective for all countries (Harrigan and Barrows, 2009).17 We thus use the FE 
estimation method, which is widely applied in panel data models and particularly in the DD 
context. 
Third, Bertrand et al. (2004) argue that DD studies often ignore the presence of 
autocorrelation in the outcome as well as treatment; hence the resulting inconsistency of standard 
errors. They pointed out three factors that make serial correlation an especially important issue in 
the DD context. First, DD estimation usually relies on fairly long time series. Second, the most 
commonly used dependent variables (outcomes) in the DD model are typically positively highly 
correlated. Third, the treatment variable in the DD model changes very little within a 
state/country over time. They suggest three solutions to solve the serial correlation problem.18 
Here, we adopt one of them, that is, allowing for an arbitrary covariance structure over time 
within each country and product given that we have a sufficient number of exporters (over 200 
                                                            
17 The exception here is a reinstitution of quotas in the summer of 2005 on some Chinese imports in both the US and 
the EU as a safeguard measure based on prior agreement when China joined the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 2001.  
18 We have also applied their second suggestion, i.e. removing the time-series dimension by aggregating the data 
into two periods, pre- and post-intervention, as part of the robustness check exercises. 
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countries each containing up to 44 categories of products).19 Clustering the panel variable 
produces an estimator of variance component estimation (VCE) that is robust not only to within-
panel (serial) correlation but also to cross-sectional heteroskedasticity that is asymptotically 
equivalent to that proposed by Arellano (1987).20 
Finally, there is an emerging concern in the empirical trade literature that excluding zero 
trade observations from the trade flow estimation is likely to produce biased estimates (e.g. Silva 
and Tenreyro, 2006; Baldwin and Harrigan, 2007; Eaton and Kortum, 2002). The interest of this 
study is in the response at the intensive margin (increase/decrease in exports) and not at the 
extensive margin (starting new exports) as quotas are imposed on positive exports. We thus 
argue that the exclusion of zero observations is less likely to have an impact on the coefficient of 
our main variable of interest, i.e. the response of QCCs to quota removal. But for the 
completeness of the empirical exercise we provide estimation results that include zero trade 
observations as part of the robustness check. 
 
4. Description of data source and construction of variables 
 
Clothing imports, the dependent variable in our model, is measured in terms of quantity (in 100 
kg).21 Volume is obviously preferable to value when analysing the impact of removal of 
quantitative restrictions. Nevertheless value-based estimations are also provided at a later stage 
to show if the main results are robust to changes in measurement imports from quantity to value. 
We use the mirror import data based on import records of the US and the EU-15 to their 
respective markets.22 The data for the US are obtained from the United States International Trade 
Commission (USITC)23 and for the EU-15 from EUROSTAT.24 Clothing imports are 
disaggregated at the 4-digit level, containing 44 categories of products from 6110 to 6310. The 
data cover a 10-year panel (2000–09), five years for each pre- and post-quota period, and consist 
                                                            
19 In our case, the outcome variable (export) exhibits state dependence and strong serial correlation over time. 
However, we found no evidence of unit root, suggesting that the data are stationary. 
20 Heteroskedasticity is another concern in a large data set that includes heterogeneous units (countries) such as in 
our case. Silva and Tenreyro (2006) argue that heteroskedasticity is quantitatively and qualitatively important in 
the gravity equation, even when controlling for fixed effects. 
21 It is defined as the weight of the commodity without any packing. A standard conversion factor is used to convert 
each clothing product to kg. 
22 Imports are usually recorded more accurately than exports because imports generate revenue and exports do not. 
23 Source: http://dataweb.usitc.gov/scripts/user_set.asp.  
24 Source: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/external_trade/data/database. 
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of 207 and 202 countries with positive exports respectively into the EU-15 and US markets. The 
EU-15 is taken as one market as it applies the same quota and tariff policy on T&C imports. 
Imports to this market from each country are thus aggregated at the EU-15 level. The focus of 
the main analysis is the extra-EU-15 imports, but estimation results that also include intra-EU-15 
imports are discussed as part of the robustness checks. 
The tariff data on clothing imports to both the US and the EU-15 were obtained from the 
UN/World Bank WITS system (World Integrated Trade Solution). The tariff rate is a weighted 
average calculated at the 4-digit-level HS code. Transport cost reflects the cross-border delivery 
cost of goods and is measured in ad valorem terms, that is, the cost of shipping relative to the 
value of goods. The share of freight cost in total imports for the US market was obtained from 
the World Trade Indicator (World Bank).25 Due to absence of information on transport costs for 
the EU-15, we use a broader measure that includes not only the freight costs but also additional 
direct and indirect costs associated with administration and communication. This is taken from 
ESCAP-World Bank Trade Cost database and is referred to as non-tariff trade cost. The non-
tariff trade cost is available on a bilateral country basis and we generated average delivery cost 
from each country to the EU-15.26 The drawback with this variable and source is the presence of 
missing information for a large number of countries and lack of direct comparability with the 
US, which is based on freight costs. In both the US and the EU-15 cases we use two data points 
of transport costs representing the pre- and post-quota-period averages.  
Information on QCCs for the US market is taken from Brambilla et al. (2010). 27 This data 
set provides a list of countries under quota limits in the US T&C market and fill rates for each 
MFA category under quotas. Following these authors, we focus on the ‘specific limit’ quotas, 
which are the most restrictive quotas applied, although there are other quota classifications 
mainly serving as a watch list. Given the scope of this study, we consider only countries with 
quota constraints on their clothing exports. In 2000, the number of countries under quota limits 
to the US market was 45. In 2004, the number of QCCs declined to 44 when Kenya and 
Mauritius were dropped from the list and Belarus was added. 
                                                            
25 This indicator reflects the US total freight charges of shipping and insurance by all modes of transportation 
divided by the net value of goods imports at the origin of US ports. 
26 ESCAP stands for Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific. The data can be found at 
http://www.unescap.org/tid/artnet/trade-costs.asp. Duval and Utoktham (2011) give further explanation of the 
construction of the variable. 
27 Source: http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/pks4/sub_international.htm. 
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The quota-limit data for the EU were obtained from SIGL (Système Intégré de Gestion de 
Licenses).28 This data set classifies countries under surveillance and quota. Since the surveillance 
is not binding, we take only countries with effective quota limits in 2004. Serbia & Montenegro, 
one of the QCCs in the EU market, is excluded from the empirical analysis due to changes in the 
political geography of the country in this period and resulting mismatch with the import data. 
This gives 15 countries under quota limits in the EU apparel market in 2004.   
As a benchmark we consider a country as quota constrained, denoted AllQCC, if it was 
under ‘specific limit’ of quotas in one or more of the MFA category products in 2004, a year 
prior to the quota removal (see Table A1 for the full list). But this may not represent the 
restrictiveness of the quota. We then constructed a measure of effectiveness of the quota 
constraint based on fill rate. The data sets for both the US and the EU-15 indicated above provide 
information of fill rate based on MFA category. The data made available for us regarding 
imports are, however, based on the HS code. The ideal measure of fill rate would be at product 
level but we were unable to match the two data sets at product level due to overlaps in the 
product categories. We thus rely on country-level aggregation to define high-fill-rate countries 
and consider two alternative measures.  
First, we calculated aggregate fill rate as the ratio of imports of all MFA category products 
under quota limits to the adjusted base quota for each country in 2004. A fill rate of 90 per cent 
and above is usually used to define quota restrictiveness (e.g. Harrigan and Barrows, 2009; 
Brambilla et al., 2010). But when defining binding quota as aggregate fill rate greater than 90 per 
cent in 2004, we find only three countries (China, Vietnam and Belarus) in the US and only one 
country (China) in the EU clothing market satisfying this limit. This is partly because the 
Agreement on T&C imposed a growth rate of quota in each phase to progressively enlarge the 
remaining quota and as a result the number of products/countries with 90 per cent and over fill 
rate declined through time. We thus considered a less restrictive definition, i.e. 80 per cent or 
more aggregate average fill rate as the binding quota to define high-fill-rate countries (hereafter 
Highfill_Ag80).29 Under this category there are nine and four countries respectively in the US 
and the EU-15 clothing market.  
                                                            
28 The web source is http://trade.ec.europa.eu/sigl/querytextiles.htm.  
29 We expected the gains to be higher when defining the conservatively binding quota as 90 per cent and above fill 
rate than as 80 per cent and above fill rate, which is what we found. Had the 80 per cent fill rate shown a negative or 
indeterminate impact, then the results of the 90 per cent and above fill rate would have been worth discussing here. 
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<Table 1 around here> 
 
Second, as an alternative measure of quota restrictiveness we also consider the fraction of 
MFA category products under quota limit that exceeded 80 per cent fill rate in 2004. We 
generated a dummy consisting of countries with above-mean fraction of MFA category under 
quota limit with fill rate 80 per cent and greater (hereafter Highfill_Fr80). This is calculated as 
the share of MFA categories of the exporting country with 80 per cent and greater fill rate in 
relation to the total number of MFA categories for which the country faces quota limits in the 
given market (US/EU-15). The average of this ratio for the US market is 0.208 and for the EU-
15 it is 0.285. There are respectively 17 and 7 QCCs that exceed these averages. 
In the empirical analysis below, we make separate estimations for each of the three 
alternative quota constraint indicators, whereby each of them is interacted with the post-quota-
period dummy (PQP) to capture post-quota performance. These interaction terms, here denoted 
as AllQCC × PQP, Highfill_Ag80 × PQP and Highfill_Fr80 × PQP, measure the response of 
respectively all QCCs, aggregate-average-based high-fill-rate, and fraction-based high-fill-rate 
countries to the removal of quota on clothing imports to the major world markets (in our case the 
US and the EU-15). Table 1 gives a definition and some summary statistics of the main variables 
used in the empirical analysis.  
 
5. Results 
 
5.1 Main results 
 
The US market 
 
Table 2 reports the estimation results for the US clothing market. The top panel (panel A) gives 
results of the post-quota years’ average performance, while the bottom panel (panel B) gives the 
full post-quota group of years’ estimation. All the estimations control for year, country and 
product fixed effects, and the standard errors are robust to cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and 
within-panel (serial) correlations. The first three columns use AllQCCs, which consists of all 44 
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countries with at least one apparel product under quota in the US market in 2004 as the treatment 
group. The control group consists of the non-quota-constrained countries or simply the rest of the 
world (ROW).  
Column 1 reports the benchmark estimation results whereby the only main variable is the 
interaction term (AllQCC × PQP). The coefficient of this interaction term (in the top panel) is 
negative and statistically significant. The year-by-year-based estimation results reported in the 
bottom panel of the same column also give negative coefficients, of which three out of five post-
quota years are statistically significant. Column 2 gives estimation results of the main model, 
which includes the tariff rates and transport costs each country faces when exporting to the US 
market. And column 3 reports results when the tariff is entered in quadratic form; it will shortly 
become clear why this is important. The introduction of the additional variables such as tariff 
rates and transport cost does not have much effect on the main variable of interest, AllQCC × 
PQP.30 Both columns 2 and 3 give coefficients equal to –0.11, which is only marginally lower 
than the benchmark result in column 1. The year-by-year estimation results reported in the 
bottom panel (columns 2 and 3) similarly all show negative coefficients, three of which in each 
column are statistically significant. This shows that following the removal of quotas, imports of 
clothing to the US market from an average QCC have fallen by about 11–12 per cent in 
comparison with the ROW. This appears contrary to the notion that the QCCs would increase 
their exports following removal of quotas. But as will shortly become clear, not all QCCs were 
effectively constrained by the quotas imposed on them.  
 
<Table 2 around here> 
 
As expected, transport cost yields a negative and highly significant coefficient. This 
coefficient measures the elasticity of clothing trade flow to the US with respect to transport cost. 
Its magnitude, at –3.82, suggests the quantitative importance of the impact of transport cost on 
trade flow. This is broadly consistent with previous studies; for example Limão and Venables 
(2001) find estimates of the elasticity of trade with respect to freight cost in the range –2 to –3. In 
contrast, the tariff variable is statistically less significant. One possible explanation for this is 
                                                            
30 Other estimation results reported for high-fill-rate countries (see cols 4–7) give similar coefficients in the presence 
and absence of tariff and transport cost variables. This is, indeed, not unexpected given that country, year and 
product fixed effects are controlled for in all estimations.  
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that, unlike transport costs, tariff rates have been steadily reduced through trade negotiations, and 
thus are a less important barrier to trade (Hummels, 2007).  
However, US tariff rates (and EU rates as well) were not reduced equally for all products 
and partner countries. There remains a large variation in tariff rates on clothing imports. While 
several products/countries enjoy free duty, others continue to pay higher rates of up to 28 per 
cent. In light of this, in column 3 we add squared tariff rates to the baseline model. The first level 
and second order of the tariff rates respectively give positive and negative coefficients. Both are 
individually statistically significant and further tests show that they also have a joint significant 
effect on imports. This implies an inverted-U-shaped relation between tariff rates and imports. 
The relation between tariff rates and imports turns negative beyond a certain level, in our 
calculation tariff rates of 11 per cent and above. Henceforth, we continue with quadratic-form 
specification. 
Quotas did not bind all countries equally. As indicated in the data section, we use two 
alternative indicators to measure effectiveness of quota constraint at the country level. In 
columns 4–5 we define countries with an above-average fraction of MFA category products 
under quota exceeding 80 per cent fill rate in 2004 as high fill (Highfill_Fr80), thus as the 
treatment group. This criterion reduces the number of QCCs in the treatment group from 44 to 
17. The control group is now the ROW, including those QCCs with a below-average fraction of 
MFA category with 80 per cent fill rate. The interaction of the high-fill-rate group and post-quota 
period (Highfill_Fr80 × PQP) gives a positive and highly significant coefficient. The results are 
very similar whether tariff and transport costs are introduced or not; thus the discussion below 
focuses on the extended model. The estimates show that following quota removal the high-fill-
rate QCCs increased their volume of clothing exports to the US market by about 45 per cent in 
contrast to the ROW. 
In columns 6–7 we use the aggregate-average-based high-fill-rate QCCs (Highfill_Ag80) as 
the treatment group. This category further narrows the number of effectively constrained 
countries to just nine. The control group is the ROW, including those QCCs with aggregate fill 
rate less than 80 per cent. The interaction term, Highfill_Ag80 × PQP, gives not only a positive 
and highly significant, but also larger-magnitude, coefficient. According to the estimates, the 
group of countries with 80 per cent and greater aggregate fill rate increased their volume of 
clothing exports to the US market by an average of 105 per cent in the post-quota period, in 
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contrast to the ROW. This is more than double compared with what was obtained from the 
fraction-based high-fill-rate estimation in columns 4–5. The year-by-year coefficients of the 
countries with high-fill-rate based on either fraction or aggregate averages are not only positive 
and significant but also increase in magnitude with time (see the bottom panel, cols 4–5). For 
example, the QCCs with high aggregate average fill rate (Highfill_Ag80) increased their exports 
by about 72.5 per cent the year after quota removal (2005) and by 142.6 per cent in the fifth year 
(2009), in comparison with the ROW. 
 
The EU-15 market 
 
Table 3 reports the estimation results for the EU-15 market based on extra-EU-15 clothing 
imports. This table has the same structure as Table 2 above, which reports US market results. 
The treatment group in the first three columns consists of all QCCs (AllQCC), columns 4–5 
fraction-based high-fill-rate countries (Highfill_Fr80), and columns 6–7 aggregate-average-
based high-fill-rate countries (Highfill_Ag80). Similarly, panel A gives the results of the average 
post-quota impact and panel B the year-to-year post-quota adjustment. All estimations control 
for country, year and product fixed effects, and the standard errors are robust to cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity and within-panel (serial) correlations. 
Similar to the US market, transport cost is negatively associated with clothing trade flow to 
the EU-15. The elasticity of imports with respect to transport cost is about –1.1, which is lower 
than in the US market case. It is worth recalling here that the transport cost variables for the US 
and the EU are not directly comparable as they were taken from different sources, using different 
methods of calculation. As in the US market case, we find an inverted-U-shaped relationship 
between imports and tariff rates in the EU-15. The tariff rate at which the relationship between 
tariff and trade turns negative is at about 5.2 per cent. This is lower than in the US case reported 
above and reflects the difference in the range of tariff rates applied in these two markets. The 
maximum tariff rate for clothing imports in the EU is only 12 per cent, which is less than half the 
maximum rate in the US. 
 
<Table 3 around here> 
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We now return to the main variable of interest and start with the estimation whereby the 
treatment group is AllQCC, constituting 15 countries. In the benchmark specification (col. 1 in 
Table 3), the AllQCC × PQP coefficient takes a negative sign but is statistically insignificant. 
The year-by-year coefficients in panel B have mixed signs and none of them, except one, is 
significant. The introduction of tariff rates and transport costs, in columns 2–3, makes no 
qualitative difference to the AllQCC × PQP coefficient, although it also reduces the number of 
observations by nearly 8000 due to missing information on these variables. The coefficient 
remains insignificant despite change of sign. The implication is that, compared to the ROW, the 
average country in the QCC group neither increased nor reduced its clothing exports to the EU-
15 market following quota removal. 
In columns 4–5 we use the fraction-based high-fill-rate countries, Highfill_Fr80, as the 
treatment group. Both columns give a positive and significant coefficient in the range of 0.22 to 
0.25. In columns 6–7 we provide estimation results of the high-fill-rate countries based on 
average aggregate fill rate of 80 per cent and above (Highfill_Ag80). Here again we find a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient (0.22). For both measures of the high fill rate the 
year-by-year estimation results in panel B also give positive and mostly significant coefficients. 
The implication is that, unlike the ‘all QCCs’ category, the high-fill-rate countries in the EU-15 
market responded positively to the removal of quotas and increased their exports by about 22–25 
per cent in comparison with the ROW.  
The magnitude of response to the removal of quotas by the high-fill-rate QCCs in the EU-15 
market is much smaller compared with what we find for the US market. For example, based on 
the aggregate average, high-fill-rate countries increased the volume of their clothing exports by 
105 per cent to the US market and only by 22 per cent to the EU-15 market in comparison with 
the ROW. One possible explanation for this difference is that the number of ‘all QCCs’, as well 
as effectively quota-constrained countries in the EU-15, is smaller than in the US. Their market 
share in the EU-15 is also correspondingly lower than in the US clothing market.31 This shows 
the presence of other major players in the EU-15 clothing market, which were not subjected to 
quota limitation or continued to enjoy preferential treatment. 
  
                                                            
31 For example, in 2004 the QCCs accounted for 63 per cent of US clothing imports, but only 30 per cent of total 
EU-15 and 43 per cent of extra-EU-15 clothing imports. 
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5.2 Some robustness checks 
 
Below we perform a sensitivity analysis on the main results. Table 4 reports a variety of 
robustness check results for the US market (panel A) and the EU-15 market (panel B). As before, 
in each market we estimate three alternative categories of the QCCs: all QCCs (row 1), fraction-
based high-fill-rate countries (row 2) and aggregate-average-based high-fill-rate countries (row 
3). All estimations, except the last column, control for tariff and transport costs in addition to 
country, year and product fixed effects. For brevity of presentation only the coefficients of the 
three alternative categories of QCCs are reported.  
We start the discussion by examining the sensitivity of the main results when changing the 
control or treatment groups. Column 1 (bottom panel) reports the estimation result for the EU-15 
when intra-EU-15 imports are included. The coefficients for all the three quota-constrained 
indicators are very close to the corresponding coefficients in the main results reported above. 
That is, the two measures of high fill rate give positive and significant coefficients, while ‘all 
QCCs’ remain insignificant. This suggests that our findings for the EU-15 are robust to 
extending the control group by including intra-EU-15 trade.  
 
<Table 4 around here> 
 
Column 2 gives results when the control group consists of only preferred countries (PRFs) 
in each of the markets.32 In the US market case all the alternative indicators give a result 
qualitatively similar to the main one. The only difference is that the magnitude of all the 
coefficients increases. The fact that the positive performance of the high-fill-rate (both 
aggregate- and fraction-based) countries improves further when the control group is only PRFs is 
not unexpected.  The worsening negative performance of the average QCCs when the control 
group is only PRFs is, however, not easy to explain. The positive performance of the high-fill-
rate countries is also further strengthened in the EU-15 market when the control group consists 
only of PRFs. In fact, the ‘all QCCs’ category in the EU-15 now also provides a positive and 
                                                            
32 The preferred countries group for the US clothing market includes those receiving preferential treatment under the 
AGOA Apparel Act, CBTPA (Caribbean Basin Trade and Partnership Act), ATPDEA (Andean Trade Promotion 
and Drug Eradication Act) and NAFTA. The preferred countries in the EU-15 market, on the other hand, include 
beneficiaries of EU-EBA, EU-Mediterranean and new EU members (EU-12) that had favorable access to the EU-15 
market even before their accession. 
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significant coefficient, suggesting that not only high-fill-rate but also all other QCCs have 
improved their exports in comparison with the PRFs. This is indeed what one would expect 
given that the primary victims (at least in the short run) of intensified global competition 
following quota removal are the PRFs, which have been developed their clothing exports under 
quota protection. 
China is increasingly dominating the world clothing market, particularly since its accession 
to the WTO in 2001. In 2009, China’s share in the US and EU-15 clothing markets reached 
respectively 39.6 per cent and 29.7 per cent, which is almost triple in comparison with 2001. It is 
also exceptionally dominant among the QCCs, accounting for about 51 per cent and 71 per cent 
of all the QCCs clothing exports respectively to the US and EU-15 markets. One would thus 
wonder if the main results above hold when China is excluded from the treatment group in all 
categories of QCCs. In this spirit, column 3 reports results when China is excluded from the 
estimation. The US market results remain qualitatively similar to our main results, except for a 
small decline in the magnitude of the coefficients. This is expected given the importance of 
China among all alternative categories of QCCs. The importance of China is more visible when 
looking at the EU-15 results. The ‘all QCCs’ category has become marginally significant with a 
negative sign, suggesting that exports to the EU-15 market from an average QCC excluding 
China actually declined in comparison with the ROW. Moreover, none of the coefficients of the 
high-fill-rate group is now significant. This means that the positive performance of the high-fill-
rate countries in the EU-15 reported in the main specification is driven by China’s extraordinary 
performance. Thus results for the EU-15 are not robust when China is excluded, which is not 
unexpected given China’s enormous share in this market (71 per cent for example in 2009) 
among the QCCs. 
When quotas are imposed, one likely response of the quota-restricted exporter is to increase 
the quality of the product and demand a higher price. Quota removal is thus expected to reverse 
this process and lead to quality downgrading. This was observed particularly in the composition 
of China’s exports following quota removal (e.g. Harrigan and Barrows, 2009; Brambilla et al., 
2010). If exporters change their product mix from expensive to cheaper products, export quantity 
might increase following quota removal without actually increasing the value of exports. This 
means that our estimation, which is based on volume of exports, does not tell us whether indeed 
the QCCs are also increasing the value of their exports and not only the quantity of cheap 
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products. In light of this, we estimated the import equation in terms of value instead of volume 
(see column 4). US imports are measured in USD, and EU-15 imports in euros.33 In both markets 
we find qualitatively similar results with the main models. The high-fill-rate countries increased 
not only the volume but also the value of their exports, suggesting that the export performance of 
the high-fill-rate QCCs in the post-quota period is not driven by increased quantity of cheaper 
products. The performance of the average QCCs also remains negative and indeterminate 
respectively in the US and EU-15 markets, which is again similar to the main model.  
Country (exporter/importer) income and size have often been included in gravity models of 
bilateral trade. So far, we have assumed that these are constant and have subsumed them into the 
country fixed effects. Now we relax this assumption and, thus, include importer GDP per capita, 
exporter GDP per capita in quadratic form, and exporter population size into the estimation. 
Column 5 reports results from this specification. As before, to save space, only the coefficients 
of the alternative quota-constrained indicators are reported, but not the other controls.34 The 
introduction of the extra controls into the model does not have much impact on the variables of 
interest in each market. Each of the QCCs indicators gives similar results to the benchmark one 
except for small changes in the magnitude of the coefficients of the high fill rates. This means 
that the coefficients for the EU-15 become a bit larger while those of the US become smaller in 
comparison with their respective main results. 
So far we have tried to address the autocorrelation problem by allowing for an arbitrary 
covariance structure over time within each country, following the suggestion by Bertrand et al. 
(2004). These authors have also suggested an alternative method, i.e. removing the time-series 
dimension by aggregating the data into two periods (pre- and post-intervention). In light of this 
we estimated aggregated data at two points, i.e. pre- and post-quota periods. The results are 
reported in column 6 and show that the main results are not sensitive to the time-aggregation of 
the data and thus are not contaminated by any autocorrelation problem in the time series. 
                                                            
33 The information on import values and import quantity for each market was obtained from the same source. The 
value of imports was deflated for price changes using a unit price pattern generated from the same data source. 
34 For both the US and EU-15 markets the exporter per capita income variable gives a positive coefficient at the first 
level and a negative one in the quadratic, all of which are statistically significant. This inverted-U-shaped relation 
between clothing exports and exporter per capita income suggests the presence of some threshold in terms of labor 
cost to stay competitive in the world clothing industry. In both markets, the importer country per capita income 
gives a negative and significant coefficient. But exporter population is statistically significant in neither of the 
markets.   
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Lastly, we address the emerging statistical concern that the exclusion of zero trade 
observations from the estimations is likely to create bias in the estimates. We assign zero to 
missing imports (the dependent variable) and create a rectangular data set of 200 or more 
countries each with 44 types of apparel export products over the 10-year period for both markets. 
We find a great deal of missing information, particularly on tariffs when imports are not 
observed. Thus tariff and transport costs are excluded from this estimation. Earlier results 
suggest that the exclusion of the tariff and transport costs has little effect on the main variable of 
interest. The model is estimated using censored regression (Tobit) methods. Country, year and 
product fixed effects are also controlled for and, as before, the standard errors are robust. Results 
are reported in column 7. The US market results for each of the QCCs categories are consistent 
with the main specification, and thus not sensitive to zero import values. There are some 
differences when it comes to the EU-15. The fraction-based high-fill-rate category for the EU-15 
continues to give a positive and significant coefficient which is qualitatively similar to the main 
specification. However, unlike the main result, the aggregate average fill rate becomes less 
significant while the ‘all QCCs’ indicator becomes statistically significant (with a negative sign). 
This will be explored further when looking at the country-level QCC performance in section 6. 
Overall, the results from the US and EU-15 are qualitatively similar. In both markets the 
QCCs performed heterogeneously. The QCCs taken together as a group have at best not gained 
(EU-15 market) and at worst they have even lost (US market) from quota removal. But when 
refining the QCCs based on high fill rate we find a large increase in their exports following quota 
removal in both markets. The magnitude of the gains in the US market is higher than in the EU-
15 market. A variety of robustness checks shows that these results hold generally. 
 
6. Heterogeneous performance of QCCs  
 
6.1 How heterogeneous are the QCCs? 
 
The discussion so far has been based on estimation results of some form of aggregate categories 
of QCCs, implicitly assuming that the impact of quota removal would be the same  at the sub-
group level. The analysis above, however, shows that the impact of quota removal on the QCCs 
has been mixed. Although the high-fill-rate countries have generally performed positively, the 
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magnitude of their gains depends on how we define the fill rate. In this section we further 
highlight the extent of heterogeneity in post-quota export performance among the QCCs by 
estimating equation (8) and disaggregating the QCCs at country level. This estimation provides 
coefficients of an interaction of country dummy and post-quota period for each QCC, which 
measures the relative post-quota performance of each QCC in comparison with the ROW. As 
before, the US and EU-15 markets are estimated separately. 
Table A2 in the Appendix provides the QCC-level full estimation results of alternative 
specifications for the US market. Column I reports the results of the main specification, which 
controls for tariff and transport costs as well as the country, year and product fixed effects. 
Column II excludes tariff and transport costs, column III considers zero trade observations, and 
column IV uses imports values (1000s of USD) instead of volume as dependent variable. There 
is not much difference between the results of these alternative specifications except for a couple 
of countries at the margin. The discussion below, therefore, elaborates on the main result in 
column I with the support of Figure 1, which sketches the estimated coefficients of each QCC.  
The shaded bars represent significant coefficients at the 10 per cent or higher level.  
The figure shows a large disparity of post-quota export performance among the QCCs. 
Based on the sign and significance of the estimated coefficients, we classified the QCCs into 
three categories (gainers, indeterminates and losers). The group of gainers here defined as QCCs 
with a positive and significant coefficient comprises 13 out of 44 QCCs. There is also a large 
difference in performance even within this group, ranging from 28.2 per cent (Colombia) to 
248.4 per cent (Vietnam) of average growth in comparison with the ROW attributed to the 
removal of quotas. Nine out of the 13 gainers are from Southern and Eastern Asia, all of which 
except Malaysia are among the top eight performers.  
 
<Figure 1 around here> 
 
The indeterminate group refers to QCCs with insignificant and mostly small coefficients. 
This group consists of 11 out of 44 QCCs, which are mixed from several continents. The third 
group is the group of losers here defined as QCCs with a negative and significant coefficient. 
This group consists of 20 out of 44 QCCs and includes four countries from the Middle East, five 
from Eastern Asia, five from Europe (mainly East), three from Latin America and two others. 
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Similarly, there is a large difference within the losers’ group in the magnitude of their loss in the 
post-quota period. The six that have lost most in the post-quota period are Russia, Qatar, 
Jamaica, Kuwait, Macedonia and Oman in descending order.   
Figure 2 similarly summarizes the results of each QCC in the EU-15 market based on the 
main specification. The full estimation results of the main model and other alternative 
specifications for the EU-15 are reported in Table A3 in the Appendix. The number of QCCs in 
the EU-15 market was only 15 (all from Asia except Belarus). Due to missing information on 
tariffs, North Korea does not appear in the main specification. Similarly to the US case, we find a 
high disparity of performance among the QCCs in the EU-15 market. Again we categorized the 
QCCs into three groups based on the sign and significance of the estimated coefficients. The 
group of gainers, i.e. with a positive and significant coefficient, consists of four countries – 
China, Vietnam, India and Pakistan respectively. According to the estimates these countries 
increased their exports in the post-quota period between 43.9 per cent (Pakistan) and 123.8 per 
cent (China), in contrast to the ROW. All these gainers are also among the top performers in the 
US market. 
 
<Figure 2 around here> 
 
The loser group (i.e. countries with a negative and significant coefficient) also consists of 
four countries – Macau, South Korea, Belarus and Singapore respectively. All these countries are 
also among the loser countries in the US market. The remaining six countries belong to the 
indeterminate category with less significant coefficients. The alternative specifications reported 
in Table A3 (cols II–V) give results similar to the main model except for a couple of countries at 
the margin, which change status. The four gainers and four loser countries remained the same 
across the specifications.  A few countries have, however, had changes of status, for example the 
Philippines, Taiwan and North Korea, from the indeterminate to the loser group, while Thailand 
has moved from the indeterminate to the gainers’ group in some of the other specifications.  
In sum, estimations for both the US and EU-15 markets show that not all QCC countries 
gain in the aftermath of quota removal. A few countries have shown extraordinary performance, 
increasing their clothing exports, while several others have seen a substantial decline. The 
implication is that the few beneficiaries have displaced not only other non-quota countries but 
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also the majority of the QCCs. There is some similarity between the US and EU-15 markets 
regarding the top and bottom performer countries, although the number of QCCs in the latter 
market is smaller than in the former. The high-performer QCCs are mostly from Eastern and 
Southern Asia, while the losers are a mix of different regions, including the Middle East, Eastern 
Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America. 
 
6.2 Explaining the heterogeneous performance of QCCs 
 
In the previous section we documented that the impact of quota removal on the QCCs is highly 
heterogeneous. We have also shown some evidence that the more binding the quota, the more 
likely it was that the country would increase its exports after its removal. However, the fill rate is 
not the sole source of differential performance. Although several gainers and losers were 
respectively among the high and low quota fill rates in the year before quota removal, there are 
also examples that show the contrary. Other factors might also be responsible for the 
heterogeneous post-quota export performance. In this section we shed some light on this by 
formally testing the sources of country-specific differences in clothing export performance 
among the QCCs in the post-quota period. Here we focus on the US market, which consists of 44 
QCCs. The reason is that the QCCs in the EU-15 market are not only too few (i.e. 15) to make 
meaningful estimation, but all the QCCs in the EU market except one (North Korea) are also on 
the list of QCCs in the US clothing market. And we know that most of the QCCs perform 
similarly across the two markets.  
The following equation specifies the model we would like to estimate:   
 
ܧݔ݌_݌ ௜݂௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߣ௧ ൅ ߙଵ݂݈݈݅ݎଶ଴଴ସ ൅ ߙଶln ሺܮܾܽ_ܿ݋ݏݐሻ௜௧ ൅ ൅ߙଷ݈݊ ௜݂௧ ൅ ߙସ݈݊ ௜ܶ௧ ൅ ߙହܴܥܣ ௜ܶ௧ ൅
ߙ଺lnሺ݌݋݌ሻ௜௧ ൅ ݑ௜௧                      (11) 
 
The subscript it (country/year) represents continuous variables that may differ by year for 
each country, while those without subscripts are constant across the period and uit is an 
idiosyncratic error term. The dependent variable (Exp_pf) is the post-quota performance of each 
QCC, measured by the country-level coefficients obtained from the fixed effect (country, year, 
and product) estimation of the benchmark model, i.e. without tariff and transport costs. 
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Excluding the tariff and transport costs in the first stage allows us to introduce them into the 
second-stage estimation. It is worth recalling here that the exclusion of the tariff and transport 
cost does not have much effect on the estimates of main variable of interest. The QCCs are fewer 
in number (maximum 44 in the US market), while our model introduces a relatively long list of 
explanatory variables, which may lead to loss of degree of freedom. In order to address this 
concern we use coefficients of the QCCs obtained from the estimation of the full post-quota 
group of years’ dummies. This gives us five post-quota-year coefficients for each QCC and 
increases the overall observations (country/year) from 44 to 220.    
The definition of the explanatory variables and justification for their inclusion in the model 
is discussed briefly as follows. The fill rate (fillr2004) is defined as the aggregate fill rate in 2004 
weighted by the number of MFA categories under quota limit. It captures the effectiveness of the 
quota limit and is expected to be positively related with export performance in the post-quota 
period. The second explanatory variable, ln(Lab_cost), is labour cost of the exporting country (in 
logarithm form). The justification is that competition in the global apparel market is expected to 
intensify in the post-quota period as a result of liberalization. The apparel industry is labour 
intensive and labour cost should remain a key factor differentiating the relative export 
performance of the countries. We use average monthly wage rate, which was obtained from the 
ILO database, the Key Indicators of Labour Market (KILM), and converted to USD using the 
nominal exchange rate from the IMF. The problem with the ILO database on wages is that it is 
not complete. In our sample of 44 QCCs, for instance, there is total absence of information for 
nine countries and missing years for some others. We partially corrected the latter problem by 
taking average wage over the given period (2005–09) instead of using the time dimension. But 
this does not cover the nine countries with total absence of information on wages. In the face of 
this problem, we use GDP per capita (in logs) as an alternative measure of level of country 
labour cost. This may not be a perfect measure of labour cost but on the positive side we find 
very high correlation (0.91) between the average wage rate and GDP per capita in our data. 
Transport costs and tariff variables are also included for the reasons cited in the Model 
section above. As before, ln݂ is defined as log of one plus average freight cost rates to the US 
and lnT as the log of one plus average ad valorem tariff rate. The existence of strong domestic 
input supply, particularly textiles, helps to reduce transport costs and time delay caused by 
imports and thus gives an advantage to apparel exports. To capture these effects we include a 
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measure of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) in textile industries, here denoted as 
RCA_Txt. The RCA data were obtained from WITS and defined as the share of textiles in total 
exports of each country relative to the share of the textiles in world exports. We have also 
controlled country size by introducing ln(pop), defined as the log of population of the exporting 
country. Data on population and GDP were obtained from UN Statistics Division (UNSD).35  
Table 5 reports the estimation results. All are estimated using OLS with year fixed effect, 
and standard errors are adjusted for within-panel correlation. Columns 1 and 2 give the 
benchmark results respectively based on GDP per capita and average wage rate to represent 
country labour cost. In Columns 3 and 4 we use the inverse of the standard deviation of the 
coefficient estimates as a weight to adjust for the fact that the coefficients have different levels of 
significance.36  
 
<Table 5 around here> 
 
Despite the differences in method and measurement, all these columns give a qualitatively 
similar result. To start with the less important variables, the estimation results show that neither 
the tariff nor the textile capability differentiates the post-quota performance of QCCs. Country 
size as measured by population is also not important in affecting export performance. 
Nevertheless, three other factors stand out, explaining the post-quota QCCs’ differential export 
performance. First, in all specifications the measure of quota fill rate takes a positive and 
significant coefficient. This confirms the previous results that countries with high quota fill rate 
tend to perform better in the post-quota period. Based on the estimates, a one-unit increase in the 
average fill rate increases the export performance of the QCCs by about 3.5 per cent to 4.9 per 
cent, depending on the model, all other variables remaining constant. The equivalent elasticity of 
export performance to the aggregate fill rate (e.g. at the mean fill rate 8 per cent) is between 0.27 
and 0.40.   
Second, the country level of labour cost is another major factor determining the differential 
performance of the QCCs. Both the alternative measures, per capita income and average wage, 
have a negative and significant coefficient. The magnitudes of the coefficients are close, in the 
                                                            
35 Source: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/selbasicFast.asp.  
36 Frazer and Biesebroeck (2010) use a similar technique to adjust for different levels of significance of the 
estimated country coefficients. 
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range of –0.48 to –0.65. Given that both the dependent and explanatory variables are in log 
format, these coefficients could be interpreted as the elasticity of export performance to labour 
cost. According to these estimates, a 1 per cent rise in labour cost reduces the post-quota export 
performance of the QCCs by about 0.60 per cent to 0.65 per cent, all other things remaining 
constant. The implication is that those countries with lower labour cost benefited more from the 
removal of quota than those advanced economies in this group that are increasingly losing their 
comparative advantage due to rising income (labour cost). Third, the freight cost is in fact the 
most important factor explaining the heterogeneous performance of the QCCs in the post-quota 
period. As expected, it yields a negative and significant coefficient. The estimates suggest that a 
1 per cent increase in the share of the cost of freight in import values to the US market reduces 
QCCs’ performance by between 14.3 and 25.5 per cent. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
On 1 January 2005, the international trade in textile and clothing (T&C) was freed from the 
quota restrictions that had persisted for more than four decades. In this paper we examined the 
post-quota-period export performance of the quota-constrained countries, QCCs, in the two 
major world clothing markets, the US and the EU-15. We used volume of clothing imports 
(disaggregated at the 4-digit level) from above 200 countries to each of these markets over the 
period 2000–09. Unlike previous studies, our data cover relatively longer post-quota years and 
allow us to understand the medium-term adjustment process following the removal of the quota. 
Using the difference-in-difference method with full fixed effects (country, product, time), we 
evaluated alternative categories of QCCs and also country-specific relative performance. 
The empirical analysis in both the US and EU-15 markets shows that the post-quota 
performance of the QCCs is highly heterogeneous. The QCCs, when taken as one group and 
compared with the ROW, at best have not gained (EU-15 market) and at worst they even lost 
(US market). Differentiating the QCCs based on their quota fill rate, we find that the high-fill-
rate countries performed positively and substantially. These results are not sensitive to a variety 
of robustness checks and are generally consistent with the prediction of the theory that those 
effectively constrained countries will increase their exports at the expense of other exporters. The 
magnitude of the gains of the high-fill-rate countries, however, depends on how we define the fill 
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rate and also on market destination. The gains in the US market are generally higher than in the 
EU-15. For example, the QCCs with 80 per cent and above aggregate fill rate increased their 
volume of exports to the US market by about 105 per cent but only by 25 per cent to the EU-15. 
This difference reflects the fact that, unlike the US market, the number of QCCs and their share 
in the EU-15 market were relatively small as there are other major players that were not subject 
to quota limitation. 
To shed further light on the extent of heterogeneity among the QCCs we estimated a 
country-specific regression and identified gainer–loser countries. For example, in the US market 
only 13 out of the 44 QCCs have a positive and significant coefficient and were identified as 
gainers vis-à-vis the ROW. The analysis in the EU-15 market similarly shows that only four out 
the 15 QCCs gained from quota removal. This shows that in both markets the majority of QCCs 
have not performed well following the removal of quotas. Indeed, almost half of the QCCs have 
a negative and significant coefficient, suggesting that they were better off under the quota 
regime. 
The removal of the quotas has exposed not only the non-quota-constrained countries but also 
the weak QCCs to fiercer competition. The major beneficiaries of the policy change are a few 
large exporters, mainly from Asia. For example about three-quarters of the gainers in US market 
– China, Vietnam, Laos, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Cambodia, Indonesia and Malaysia – are 
from Southern and Eastern Asia. All of the four gainers in EU-15 (China, Vietnam, India and 
Pakistan) are also from Asia. This provides evidence consistent with the prediction that quota 
removal has led to increasing concentration of the clothing industry in a few countries. We 
formally examined the likely source of the differential performance among the QCCs. The 
results show that quota fill rate is positively associated with the post-quota export performance 
but it explains only a little of the variation in the performance of the QCCs. Other factors 
measuring country cost-competitiveness such as labour cost and international transport cost 
appear to be more important, impacting the differential post-quota-period export performance 
among the QCCs.  
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Table 1: Definition and summary statistics of the main variables 
 
 
Variable name Variable description Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
US market       
ln(ݔ) volume Log of import volume (100 kg) 39031 4.712 3.529 0 14.82 
ln(ݔ) value Log of import value (1000s USD) 40044 12.40 3.498 5.28 22.47 
AllQCC × PQP Interaction, all QCCs and post-quota years 40044 0.190 0.392 0 1 
Highfill_Fr80 × PQP Interaction, high-fill-rate countries and post-
quota-years dummy (fraction based) 
40044 0.084 0.278 0 1 
Highfill_Ag80 × PQP Interaction, high-fill-rate countries and post-
quota-years dummy (aggregate average based) 
40044 0.043 0.203 0 1 
ln݂ Log of one plus tariff-equivalent freight cost 39575 0.052 0.027 0.0045 0.373 
lnT Log of one plus weighted average tariff rate at 
4-digit level 
40016 0.096 0.055 0 0.254 
lnT_sq Log of one plus weighted average tariff rate at 
4-digit level squared 
40016 0.012 0.011 0 0.065 
ln(USgdp_pc) Log of GDP per capita USA 40044 10.60 0.11 10.45 10.74 
ln(ex_gdp_pc) Log of GDP per capita of exporter country to 
the US market 
39717 8.46 1.56 4.45 11.42 
ln(ex_gdp_pc)_sq Log of GDP per capita of exporter country to 
the US market squared 
39717 73.97 25.99 19.84 130.30 
ln(pop) Log of population of the exporter country to 
the US market 
39717 16.32 1.769 8.44 21.00 
       
EU-15 market       
ln(ݔ) volume Log of import quantity (100 kg) 42950 4.59 3.47 0 16.04 
ln(ݔ) value Log of import value (1000s euros) 42313 5.11 3.37 0 15.22 
QCC × PQP Interaction, all QCCs and post-quota years 48071 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Highfill_Fr80 × PQP Interaction, high-fill-rate countries and post-
quota-years dummy (fraction based) 
48071 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Highfill_Ag80 × PQP Interaction, high-fill-rate countries and post-
quota-years dummy (aggregate average based) 
48071 0.02 0.13 0 1 
ln݂ Log of one plus tariff-equivalent non-tariff 
trade cost 
41609 0.98 0.23 0.532 2.01 
lnT Log of one plus weighted-average tariff rate at 
four digit level 
40355 0.04 0.05 0 0.12 
lnT_sq Log of one plus weighted-average tariff rate at 
four digit level squared 
40355 0.004 0.01 0 0.02 
ln(EU15gdp_pc) Log of GDP per capita EU-15 average 48071 10.18 0.08 10.05 10.29 
ln(ex_gdp_pc) Log of GDP per capita of exporter country to 
the EU-15 market 
47273 8.13 1.54 4.45 11.61 
ln(ex_gdp_pc)_sq Log of GDP per capita of exporter country to 
the EU-15 market squared 
47273 68.49 25.04 19.84 134.82 
ln(pop) Log of population of the exporter country to 
the EU-15 market 
47273 15.90 2.11 8.44 20.99 
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Table 2: Main results, US clothing market 
 
Dependent variable 
ln(import quantity) 
Treatment group All QCCs 
Treatment group high-fill-rate QCCs 
Highfill_Fr80 Highfill_Ag80 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
     
Panel A: average post–quota–period performance     
AllQCC × PQP –0.12 –0.11 –0.11     
 (0.05)** (0.05)** (0.05)**     
Highfill_Fr80 × PQP    0.47 0.45   
    (0.07)*** (0.07)***   
Highfill_Ag80 × PQP      1.09 1.05 
      (0.09)*** (0.09)*** 
        
ln(1 + tariff)  0.511 3.889  3.419  3.085 
  (0.566) (1.503)***  (1.508)**  (1.509)** 
ln(1 + tariff)_sq   –17.871  –16.202  –15.016 
   (7.212)**  (7.232)**  (7.237)** 
ln(1 + trns_cost)  –3.816 –3.751  –3.462  –2.443 
  (1.867)** (1.873)**  (1.864)*  (1.905) 
        
R-squared 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 
# of observations 39011 38517 38517 39011 38517 39011 38517 
# of countries 202 185 185 202 185 202 185 
# of QCCs 44 44 44 17 17 9 9 
        
Panel B: year–by–year post–quota–period performance     
2005 –0.023 –0.004 –0.004 0.502 0.381 0.741 0.725 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.075)*** (0.063)*** (0.085)*** (0.086)*** 
2006 –0.052 –0.045 –0.046 0.491 0.443 0.898 0.874 
 (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.083)*** (0.070)*** (0.095)*** (0.096)*** 
2007 –0.141 –0.142 –0.149 0.525 0.465 1.097 1.055 
 (0.063)** (0.064)** (0.064)** (0.091)*** (0.076)*** (0.101)*** (0.103)*** 
2008 –0.227 –0.201 –0.193 0.39132 0.483 1.223 1.205 
 (0.068)*** (0.069)*** (0.069)*** (0.063)*** (0.083)*** (0.108)*** (0.109)*** 
2009 –0.185 –0.183 –0.191 0.465 0.490 1.475 1.426 
 (0.073)** (0.073)** (0.073)*** (0.070)*** (0.091)*** (0.113)*** (0.115)*** 
ln(1 + tariff)  0.519 3.908  3.389  2.887 
  (0.568) (1.510)***  (1.513)**  (1.514)* 
ln(1 + tariff)_sq   –17.895  –16.107  –14.355 
   (7.225)**  (7.243)**  (7.250)** 
ln(1 + trns_cost)  –3.814 –3.749  –3.462  –2.448 
  (1.865)** (1.870)**  (1.865)*  (1.906) 
        
R-squared 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 
# of observations 39011 38517 38517 39011 38517 39011 38517 
# of countries 202 185 185 202 185 202 185 
# of QCCs 44 44 44 17 17 9 9 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; and *** 
significant at 1 per cent. All estimations control for country, year and product fixed effects. Panel A and B provide 
results from separate estimations, the former using one dummy to capture the post–quota period and the latter the 
full post–quota group of years (2005–09).  
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Table 3: Main results, EU-15 clothing market 
 
Dependent variable 
ln(import quantity) 
Treatment group all QCCS 
Treatment group high-fill-rate QCCs 
Highfill_Fr80 Highfill_Ag80 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Panel A: average post-quota-period performance     
AllQCC × PQP –0.02 0.03 0.004     
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)     
Highfill_Fr80 × PQP    0.22 0.25   
    (0.10)** (0.07)***   
Highfill_Ag80 × PQP      0.22 0.22 
        (0.06)*** (0.10)** 
ln(1 + tariff)  0.153 7.63  7.07  7.57 
  (0.587) (2.916)***  (2.91)**  (2.89)*** 
ln(1 + tariff)_sq   –69.46  –65.46  –69.22 
   (28.18)**  (28.14)**  (28.04)** 
ln(1 + trns_cost)  –1.043 –1.026  –1.178  –1.007 
  (0.368)*** (0.369)***  (0.363)***  (0.358)*** 
        
R-squared 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.73 
Observations 42313 34257 34257 42313 34257 42313 34257 
# of countries 194 139 139 194 139 194 139 
# of QCCs 15 15 15 7 7 4 4 
        
Panel B: year-by-year post-quota-period performance     
     
2005 –0.087 –0.02611 –0.038 0.080 0.129 0.102 0.121 
 (0.0507)* (0.05117) (0.052) (0.061) (0.065)** (0.093) (0.097) 
2006 0.066 0.105 0.084 0.230 0.246 0.201 0.201 
 (0.053) (0.055)* (0.055) (0.063)*** (0.067)*** (0.092)** (0.096)** 
2007 0.032 0.063 0.042 0.317 0.335 0.344 0.348 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.067)*** (0.071)*** (0.101)*** (0.105)*** 
2008 –0.026 0.034 0.005 0.274 0.275 0.292 0.266 
 (0.066) (0.067) (0.067) (0.077)*** (0.080)*** (0.117)** (0.118)** 
2009 –0.086 –0.050 –0.078 0.209 0.251 0.148 0.188 
 (0.078) (0.079) (0.080) (0.098)** (0.099)** (0.155) (0.154) 
ln(1 + tariff)  0.169 7.658  7.002  7.574 
  (0.588) (2.920)***  (2.918)**  (2.897)*** 
ln(1 + tariff)_sq   –69.545  –64.805  –69.241 
   (28.226)**  (28.217)**  (28.089)** 
ln(1 + trns_cost)  –1.042 –1.025  –1.178  –1.007 
  (0.368)*** (0.369)***  (0.363)***  (0.358)*** 
        
R-squared 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.73 
Observations 42313 34257 34257 42313 34257 42313 34257 
# of countries 194 139 139 194 139 194 139 
# of QCCs 15 15 15 7 7 4 4 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; and *** 
significant at 1 per cent. All estimations control for country, year and product fixed effects. Panel A and B provide 
results from separate estimations, the former using one dummy to capture the post-quota period and the latter the full 
post-quota group of years (2005–09).  
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Table 4: Robustness checks for the US and EU-15 markets 
 
  
Intra-EU-
15 
imports 
included 
Control 
group 
PRFs 
China 
excluded 
Imports, 
value 
based 
Extra 
controls 
added 
Time pre-
post quota 
aggregation 
Zero 
obser. 
included 
(Tobit) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A: the US market       
1 AllQCC × PQP  –0.30 –0.18 –0.10 –0.12 –0.01 –0.27 
   (0.07)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)* (0.05)** (0.05) (0.06)*** 
         
2 Highfill_Fr80 × 
PQP 
 0.53 0.34 0.34 0.37 0.38 0.38 
   (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.06)*** (0.07)*** (0.08)*** (0.07)*** 
         
3 Highfill_Ag80 × 
PQP 
 1.25 0.91 0.95 0.75 0.97 0.96 
   (0.09)*** (0.10)*** (0.09)*** (0.10)*** (0.08)*** (0.10)*** 
         
 Observations  22500 38097 39547 38482 7918 88880 
 R-squared  0.67 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.71  
         
Panel B: the EU-15 market       
1 AllQCC × PQP –0.03 0.13 –0.10 –0.07 0.03 –0.01 –0.154 
  (0.05) (0.06)** (0.05)* (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.055)*** 
         
2 Highfill_Fr80 × 
PQP 
0.21 0.37 0.07 0.17 0.26 0.14 0.150 
  (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.07) (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.07)* (0.065)** 
         
3 Highfill_Ag80 × 
PQP 
0.19 0.35 –0.13 0.16 0.26 0.20 0.160 
  (0.10)* (0.10)*** (0.12) (0.09)* (0.08)*** (0.10)* (0.097) 
         
 Observations 39587 14906 33817 34257 34257 7677 85803 
 R-squared 0.77 0.76 0.72 0.76 0.74 0.77  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; and *** 
significant at 1 per cent. 
All estimations control for country, year and product fixed effects. The top panel reports results for the USA, and the 
bottom panel results for the EU-15. The results in the above table are based respectively on 18 and 21 different 
estimations in each market. Tariff and transport costs are controlled in all columns except the last one. Column 5 
introduces additional controls such as GDP per capita of the exporting and importing country and population. But 
for the sake of presentation only the coefficients of the main variable of interest, i.e. indicators of quota constraint, 
are reported.  
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Table 5: Explaining the country-level QCCs’ export performance in the US market 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable country coefficients 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Quota fill rate (per cent)  0.035 0.033 0.049 0.046 
 (0.014)** (0.015)** (0.018)** (0.021)** 
ln(gdp_pc) –0.527  –0.636  
 (0.171)***  (0.219)***  
ln(wage_av)  –0.484  –0.649 
  (0.203)**  (0.240)** 
ln(pop) 0.053 0.182 –0.036 0.095 
 (0.144) (0.126) (0.197) (0.175) 
ln(1 + tariff) –1.889 –1.903 –6.769 –8.711 
 (3.848) (5.221) (5.958) (7.049) 
ln(1 + trns_cost) –14.316 –21.192 –16.604 –25.561 
 (5.069)*** (11.248)* (6.218)** (13.512)* 
RCA_textile –0.013 0.013 –0.010 0.021 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.030) (0.028) 
     
Observations 220 175 220 175 
R-squared 0.45 0.48 0.44 0.47 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant 
at 1 per cent. 
All estimations control for year fixed effects. The dependent variable in all estimations is the coefficient generated 
from the QCC level and full post-quota-years estimation. Columns 3 and 4 use the inverse of the standard deviation 
of the coefficient estimates as a weight to adjust for the difference in the statistical significance among the 
coefficients. 
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Notes: The bars represent coefficients from the country-specific DD estimation based on the main model that 
controls for tariff and transport costs. Shaded bars indicate significant coefficients at 10 per cent or higher level. See 
Table A2 column I for full results. 
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Figure 1: The post‐quota performance of QCCs in the US clothing 
market
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Notes: The bars represent coefficients from the country-specific DD estimation based on the main model that 
controls for tariff and transport costs. Shaded bars indicate significant coefficients at 10 per cent or higher level. See 
Table A3 column I for full results. 
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Appendix A1: List of QCCs in the US and EU-15 apparel markets, 2000 and 2004 
 
 The US apparel market The EU-15 apparel market 
Country 
Number of 
MFA category 
under quota 
limit in 
Aggregate fill 
rate 
Ratio of MFA 
catg. with fill 
rate >=80 per 
cent 
Number of MFA 
category under quota 
limit in 
Aggregate fill 
rate 
Ratio of MFA 
catg. with fill 
rate >=80 per 
cent 
 2000 2004 2000 2004 2004 2000 2004 2000 2004 2004 
Bahrain 2 2 0.35 0.01 0.00      
Bangladesh 21 20 1.00 0.82 0.60      
Belarus - 2 - 0.95 1.00 16 16 90.2 33.8 0.19 
Brazil 13 10 0.30 0.33 0.10      
Bulgaria 5 5 0.71 0.64 0.00      
Cambodia 12 13 0.85 0.83 0.46      
China 80 62 0.95 0.91 0.66 39 23 95.3 90.7 0.78 
Colombia 1 1 0.80 0.59 0.00      
Costa Rica 5 5 0.64 0.12 0.00      
Czech Rep. 3 3 0.11 0.04 0.00      
Dominican Rep. 13 13 0.81 0.24 0.08      
Egypt 4 4 0.55 0.43 0.00      
El Salvador 1 1 0.86 0.11 0.00      
Fiji 2 2 0.91 0.68 0.00      
Guatemala 5 5 0.87 0.42 0.40      
Hong Kong 56 47 0.80 0.65 0.30 28 18 74.2 62.2 0.33 
Hungary 7 7 0.16 0.03 0.00      
India 16 15 0.98 0.84 0.60 12 10 89.4 89.1 0.80 
Indonesia 30 28 0.95 0.81 0.54      
Jamaica 8 8 0.12 0.02 0.00      
Korea, South 49 43 0.59 0.66 0.44 28 20 69.1 70.7 0.20 
Kuwait 3 3 0.20 0.01 0.00      
Laos 1 1 0.38 0.02 0.00      
Macau 22 21 0.84 0.73 0.52 22 14 92.0 89.4 0.43 
Macedonia 5 5 0.60 0.33 0.20      
Malaysia 22 20 0.70 0.41 0.20 7 7 53.9 31.7 0.14 
Nepal 2 9 0.89 0.28 0.00      
Oman 9 7 0.80 0.47 0.00      
Pakistan 7 23 0.67 0.81 0.52 9 8 55.5 52.6 0.38 
Philippines 25 29 0.92 0.56 0.48 16 11 35.8 40.1 0.18 
Poland 34 7 0.81 0.03 0.00      
Qatar 7 3 0.06 0.33 0.00      
Romania 3 22 0.67 0.05 0.09      
Russia 23 1 0.13 0.00 0.00      
Singapore 1 22 0.66 0.13 0.05 7 7 17.0 8.3 0.00 
Slovak Rep. 22 3 0.30 0.17 0.00      
Sri Lanka 3 26 0.46 0.67 0.27      
Taiwan 29 46 0.86 0.58 0.17 28 18 55.3 38.7 0.06 
Thailand 53 24 0.56 0.62 0.33 11 7 61.1 71.7 0.29 
Turkey 26 14 0.81 0.44 0.14      
Ukraine 16 4 0.75 0.83 0.25      
UAE 4 18 0.40 0.53 0.22      
Uruguay 19 6 0.92 0.03 0.00      
Vietnam 6 22 0.01 0.92 0.50 22 22 89.8 60.9 0.14 
N. Korea      32 32 32.5 26.6 0.03 
           
Average  14.4   0.208     0.285 
Notes: The aggregate fill rate is the ratio of aggregate imports of apparel from the given country to the aggregate 
base of apparel quota specified by the USA/EU-15 for that country in a given year. The ratio of MFA category under 
quota limit with fill rate of 80 per cent and greater is defined by the share of MFA categories of the exporting 
country with 80 per cent and greater fill rate in the total number of MFA categories the under quota limit.  
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Table A2: Results from country-specific estimation for the US clothing market 
 
QCC post-
quota 
Main model 
Tariff & transport costs 
excluded 
Censored model (Tobit) 
with zero obs. 
Value based (1000s 
USD) 
I II III IV 
coef. se. robust coef. se. robust coef. se. robust coef. se. robust 
Vietnam 2.484 (0.208)*** 2.488 (0.209)*** 2.715 (0.204)*** 2.557 (0.211)*** 
China 1.903 (0.125)*** 1.926 (0.124)*** 1.714 (0.125)*** 1.633 (0.114)*** 
Laos 1.86 (0.410)*** 1.872 (0.410)*** 2.822 (0.393)*** 1.588 (0.453)*** 
India 1.021 (0.135)*** 1.038 (0.135)*** 0.836 (0.138)*** 0.929 (0.147)*** 
Indonesia 0.874 (0.152)*** 0.906 (0.152)*** 0.787 (0.155)*** 0.705 (0.147)*** 
Bangladesh 0.854 (0.127)*** 0.869 (0.128)*** 0.703 (0.154)*** 0.767 (0.155)*** 
Pakistan 0.828 (0.152)*** 0.843 (0.152)*** 0.620 (0.131)*** 0.611 (0.136)*** 
Cambodia 0.727 (0.260)*** 0.735 (0.261)*** 1.003 (0.295)*** 0.579 (0.252)** 
Slovak Rep. 0.541 (0.277)* 0.577 (0.275)** 1.115 (0.290)*** 0.675 (0.262)** 
Egypt 0.508 (0.195)*** 0.504 (0.194)*** 0.443 (0.207)** 0.334 (0.225) 
Malaysia 0.368 (0.183)** 0.375 (0.183)** 0.474 (0.255)* 0.161 (0.170) 
El Salvador 0.433 (0.223)* 0.352 (0.218) 0.407 (0.194)** 0.024 (0.205) 
Colombia 0.282 (0.157)* 0.265 (0.157)* 0.096 (0.159) 0.300 (0.152)** 
Thailand 0.221 (0.155) 0.244 (0.156) –0.048 (0.153) 0.227 (0.107)** 
Philippines 0.194 (0.146) 0.187 (0.144) 0.030 (0.146) 0.027 (0.144) 
Poland 0.15 (0.173) 0.179 (0.173) 0.094 (0.186) 0.416 (0.172)** 
Czech Rep. 0.056 (0.187) 0.074 (0.187) –0.031 (0.210) 0.494 (0.239)** 
Uruguay 0.03 (0.289) 0.016 (0.285) 0.182 (0.258) 0.114 (0.317) 
Sri Lanka –0.017 (0.196) –0.022 (0.201) –0.026 (0.185) –0.118 (0.202) 
Bahrain –0.061 (0.585) –0.144 (0.584) 0.363 (0.511) –0.570 (0.596) 
Guatemala 0.002 (0.202) –0.083 (0.195) –0.228 (0.206) –0.252 (0.201) 
Hungary –0.099 (0.176) –0.099 (0.176) –0.196 (0.236) –0.046 (0.187) 
Brazil –0.261 (0.247) –0.271 (0.246) –0.351 (0.244) 0.178 (0.215) 
Turkey –0.184 (0.193) –0.189 (0.192) –0.379 (0.193)** 0.201 (0.172) 
Ukraine –0.658 (0.384)* –0.544 (0.378) –0.128 (0.356) –0.286 (0.346) 
Taiwan –0.287 (0.119)** –0.282 (0.118)** –0.420 (0.155)*** –0.321 (0.123)*** 
Hong Kong –0.519 (0.228)** –0.504 (0.228)** –0.600 (0.250)** –0.605 (0.188)*** 
Nepal –0.552 (0.268)** –0.550 (0.267)** –0.819 (0.282)*** –0.501 (0.255)** 
UAE –0.658 (0.211)*** –0.611 (0.208)*** –0.710 (0.269)*** –0.642 (0.207)*** 
Romania –0.663 (0.224)*** –0.645 (0.223)*** –0.447 (0.261)* –0.059 (0.234) 
Domn. Rep. –0.614 (0.202)*** –0.680 (0.197)*** –0.285 (0.227) –0.765 (0.209)*** 
Macau –0.760 (0.205)*** –0.739 (0.205)*** –0.405 (0.234)* –0.749 (0.185)*** 
S. Korea –0.854 (0.182)*** –0.853 (0.180)*** –1.077 (0.176)*** –0.860 (0.175)*** 
Bulgaria –0.915 (0.242)*** –0.896 (0.242)*** –0.840 (0.272)*** –0.482 (0.224)** 
Costa Rica –0.882 (0.274)*** –0.931 (0.271)*** –0.725 (0.267)*** –0.685 (0.310)** 
Singapore –0.958 (0.255)*** –1.048 (0.248)*** –1.011 (0.315)*** –1.010 (0.213)*** 
Belarus –1.856 (0.291)*** –1.788 (0.291)*** –1.753 (0.386)*** –1.468 (0.370)*** 
Fiji –1.589 (0.437)*** –1.821 (0.379)*** –1.699 (0.409)*** –1.460 (0.355)*** 
Oman –1.910 (0.308)*** –1.900 (0.308)*** –3.873 (0.414)*** –1.881 (0.355)*** 
Macedonia –2.225 (0.319)*** –2.215 (0.315)*** –0.930 (0.357)*** –1.863 (0.304)*** 
Kuwait –2.328 (0.292)*** –2.315 (0.291)*** –2.742 (0.630)*** –2.415 (0.377)*** 
Jamaica –2.404 (0.465)*** –2.435 (0.464)*** –2.589 (0.381)*** –2.678 (0.480)*** 
Qatar –2.908 (0.541)*** –2.803 (0.533)*** –2.695 (0.541)*** –3.135 (0.541)*** 
Russia –2.851 (0.328)*** –2.866 (0.327)*** –3.575 (0.339)*** –2.427 (0.328)*** 
         
# observ. 38517  39011  88880  40044  
R-squared 0.68  0.68    0.67  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; and *** significant at 1 per 
cent. All estimations are based on year, country and product fixed effects. The country coefficients are interaction terms with 
post-quota period and in all cases the control group is the ROW. In all columns except IV the dependent variable is the log of 
volume of imports. 
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Table A3: Results from country-specific estimation for the EU-15 clothing market 
 
 
Tariff & 
transport cost 
included 
Tariff & 
transport cost 
excluded 
Intra-EU-15 
imports 
included 
Censored 
model (Tobit) 
with zero obs. 
Value based 
(1000 euros) 
 I II III IV  V 
China 1.231 1.238 1.195 1.128 1.015 
 (0.098)*** (0.093)*** (0.093)*** (0.094)*** (0.083)*** 
Vietnam 0.729 0.779 0.734 0.914 0.678 
 (0.133)*** (0.132)*** (0.133)*** (0.139)*** (0.117)*** 
India 0.745 0.634 0.592 0.524 0.588 
 (0.093)*** (0.089)*** (0.088)*** (0.090)*** (0.081)*** 
Pakistan 0.380 0.439 0.396 0.363 0.289 
 (0.082)*** (0.069)*** (0.068)*** (0.088)*** (0.074)*** 
Thailand 0.147 0.159 0.116 0.054 0.193 
 (0.091) (0.087)* (0.087) (0.089) (0.082)** 
Indonesia 0.132 0.114 0.072 –0.001 0.057 
 (0.092) (0.089) (0.088) (0.090) (0.084) 
Hong Kong 0.065 0.001 –0.041 –0.104 –0.155 
 (0.150) (0.140) (0.140) (0.142) (0.135) 
Malaysia –0.050 0.025 –0.019 –0.000 –0.150 
 (0.159) (0.161) (0.161) (0.172) (0.136) 
Philippines –0.095 –0.119 –0.163 –0.255 –0.107 
 (0.130) (0.128) (0.128) (0.127)** (0.135) 
Taiwan –0.138 –0.181 –0.223 –0.298 –0.378 
 (0.124) (0.117) (0.117)* (0.118)** (0.108)*** 
North Korea  –0.570 –0.628 –1.694 –0.809 
  (0.506) (0.504) (0.373)*** (0.478)* 
Singapore –0.301 –0.333 –0.375 –0.470 –0.392 
 (0.154)* (0.171)* (0.170)** (0.168)*** (0.133)*** 
Belarus –0.805 –0.784 –0.826 –0.787 –0.697 
 (0.233)*** (0.225)*** (0.226)*** (0.225)*** (0.210)*** 
South Korea –0.986 –0.982 –1.025 –1.053 –0.981 
 (0.185)*** (0.185)*** (0.184)*** (0.192)*** (0.170)*** 
Macau –1.502 –1.372 –1.418 –1.168 –1.322 
 (0.231)*** (0.230)*** (0.230)*** (0.239)*** (0.210)*** 
      
Observations 34257 42313 48907 85803 42313 
R-squared 0.74 0.72 0.76  0.75 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; and *** 
significant at 1 per cent. All estimations are based on year, country and product fixed effects. The country 
coefficients are interaction terms with post-quota period and in all cases the control group is the ROW. In all 
columns except IV the dependent variable is the log of volume of imports. 
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